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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutes and rules are determinative of the 
question at issue in this appeal: 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 401: 
'Relevant evidence1 means evidence having any tendency 
to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United 
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules 
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue 
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (b) (4): 
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, 
otherwise discoverable under the provisions of 
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or 
developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, 
may be obtained only as follows: 
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require 
any other party to identify each person whom the 
other party expects to call as an expert witness 
at trial, to state the subject matter on which the 
expert is expected to testify, and to state the 
substance of the facts and opinions to which the 
expert is expected to testify and a summary of the 
grounds for each opinion. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 (e): 
A party who has responded to a request for discovery 
with a response that was complete when made is under no 
duty to supplement his response to include information 
thereafter acquired, except as follows: 
(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to 
supplement his response with respect to any 
question directly addressed to (A) the identity 
and location of persons having knowledge of 
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discoverable matters, and (B) the identity of each 
person expected to be called as an expert witness 
at trial, the subject matter on which he is 
expected to testify, and the substance of his 
testimony. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 51: 
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier 
time as the court reasonably directs, any party may 
file written requests that the court instruct the jury 
on the law as set forth in said requests. The court 
shall inform counsel of its proposed action upon the 
requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall 
furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed 
instructions, unless the parties stipulate that such 
instructions may be given orally or otherwise waive 
this requirement. If the instructions are to be given 
in writing, all objections thereto must be made before 
the instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, 
objections may be made to the instructions after they 
are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to 
consider its verdict. No party may assign as error the 
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an 
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter 
to which he objects and the grounds for his objection. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, the 
appellate court, in its discretion and in the interests 
of justice, may review the giving or the failure to 
give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to 
make objections, and they shall be made out of the 
hearing of the jury. 
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made 
after the court has instructed the jury. The court 
shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if 
the court states any of the evidence, it must instruct 
the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all 
questions of fact. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT ADEQUATELY INSTRUCT THE 
JURY ON THE PROPER STANDARD OF CARE REQUIRED OF 
DEFENDANT. 
A. Plaintiff Submitted His Proposed Jury Instruction in 
Compliance with Rule 51 and the Court's Pretrial order. 
Defendant contends that plaintiff's requested jury 
instruction should be rejected and not considered on the basis 
that it was informal and "not properly submitted" in compliance 
with Rule 51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and because it 
failed to comply with the court's Pretrial Order. Regarding 
defendant's first contention, defendant relies on the following 
portion of Rule 51, which provides in relevant part, that "[a] 
party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury 
on the law as set forth in said requests." Utah R. Civ. P. 51 
(emphasis added). Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. 
First, Rule 51 merely requires that the request for a 
jury instruction be written. At the close of trial, plaintiff's 
attorney, in conjunction with an objection to the court's 
proposed jury instructions, presented the court with a written 
instruction requesting that an instruction regarding the standard 
of care for a minor engaged in an adult activity be given. Thus, 
the requested instruction was made in conformance with the 
requirements of Rule 51. 
And second, in denying plaintiff's requested jury 
instruction, the court did not cite the instruction's failure to 
conform to a specific form or rule as a reason for its denial. 
The court's reason for denial was that the instruction was 
"cumulative" in that the court believed the issue was 
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sufficiently addressed through other general negligence 
instructions. 
Defendant additionally asserts that plaintiff's 
requested instruction did not comply with the court's Pretrial 
Order, which required submission of proposed jury instructions on 
December 21, 1992. Addressing the late submission of jury 
instructions, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "the court 
must permit some latitude for counsel to submit an additional 
instruction or two at a later time if the trial has taken some 
unexpected turn that would justify doing so." Hanks v. 
Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P.2d 564, 566 (Utah 1960). 
Moreover, the Pretrial Order provided that "no additional 
requests are contemplated, unless counsel can demonstrate a need 
to address unanticipated legal or factual issues arising during 
trial." (Emphasis added.) (R. 260). Plaintiff's requested jury 
instruction clearly falls within the court's contemplation of the 
need to address a new issue. 
In opening and closing arguments and throughout trial, 
defense counsel argued that the jurors should judge the driving 
conduct of the 16-year old defendant according to what is 
appropriate and reasonable conduct for a new, inexperienced, 16-
year old driver. Certainly, the issue of the ordinary standard 
of care relative to showing negligence was not a new or 
unanticipated issue. However, defense counsel's repeated 
arguments surrounding the requisite standard of care for a 16-
year old driver effectively created a new issue. That is, it 
served to confuse the jury as to the correct standard of care to 
which a 16-year old driving a car should be held. Defense 
counsel's efforts led the jury to believe that a 16-year old 
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driver is held to a lower standard of reasonable driving conduct. 
It therefore became necessary for plaintiff's attorney to 
attempt, through the jury instruction, to clarify this issue for 
the jury so as to prevent the jury from applying the wrong 
standard of care in assessing defendant's negligence. The 
requested instruction said only that a minor engaged in an 
activity which is normally performed by adults is held to the 
same standard of care as an adult engaged in that activity. 
Accordingly, plaintiff submitted the requested instruction 
concerning the standard of care for a minor engaged in an adult 
activity in response to an "unanticipated" legal issue that arose 
during trial. 
Again, plaintiff's position is supported by the court's 
actions. The court did not indicate that plaintiff had failed to 
comply with the Pretrial Order as a reason for denying the 
requested instruction. 
In short, the submission of plaintiff's requested jury 
instruction complied with the requirements of both Rule 51 and 
the court's Pretrial Order. 
B. The Minor Defendant Operating a Motor Vehicle Is Held 
to the Standard of Care of An Adult. 
Defendant argues that in assessing defendant's 
negligence, the jury can take into consideration the defendant's 
age and driving experience. Defendant relies on Nelson v. 
Arrowhead Freight Lines. Ltd., 104 P.2d 225 (Utah 1940), in which 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that in determining whether 
plaintiff was contributorily negligent in becoming a passenger in 
the car, the jury must consider all facts and circumstances 
existing at the time of the collision. This included 
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consideration of "age of the deceased, physical and mental 
development, general past experiences • . . ." Id, at 229. 
Nelson is patently distinguishable from the case before 
this court. In Nelson, it was a 16-year old minor passenger 
whose degree of negligence was being assessed and the issue 
surrounded whether the minor was negligent in becoming a 
passenger. Plaintiffs sought an instruction to the effect the 
minor passenger be held to a lesser standard of care. The court 
upheld the trial court's refusal to allow the requested 
instruction. The court refused the instruction on the basis that 
the instruction was unnecessary because the jury had already been 
instructed to consider "all facts and circumstances." Id. And 
further, because there was no rule setting forth the standard of 
care required of a minor passenger in a motor vehicle. The only 
law applicable provided that a 16-year old is generally charged 
with the same degree of care as an adult. See generally Id. at 
228-29. 
In the instant case, unlike Nelson, there is a specific 
law which provides the specific standard of care to which 
defendant is held. Defendant is held to a heightened standard of 
care. As the court in Nelson recognized, generally minors are 
entitled to be judged by standards commensurate with their age 
and experience, but a minor is "held to the same degree of care 
in the operation of motor vehicles as persons who have attained 
their majority." Id. at 228 (emphasis added). 
C. The Trial Court Should Have Allowed Plaintiff's 
Requested Jury Instruction to Clarify the Law and More 
Completely Advise the Jury. 
Dispositive of this issue is whether the jury 
instructions properly instructed the jury on the law and the 
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applicable standard of care required of this defendant. 
Defendant avers that the jury instructions, taken as a whole, 
accurately instructed the jury. While nothing in the court's 
instructions was necessarily inaccurate, the instructions failed 
to adequately instruct the jury. The trial court has a duty to 
adequately instruct the jury as to the law relative to the case. 
See Goode v. Dayton Disposal. Inc., 738 P.2d 638, 640 (Utah 1987) 
(citing Watters v. Query, 626 P.2d 455, 458-59 (Utah)); see also 
Maltbv v. Cox Constr. Co. Inc.. 598 P.2d 336, 341 (Utah 1979), 
cert, denied. 444 U.S. 945 (court upheld refusal of requested 
instruction where other instructions adequately covered the law). 
Plaintiff's requested instruction relative to the applicable 
standard of care for a 16-year old driver surely would have 
assisted in clarifying and more completely instructing the jury 
on the law. This court has stated that failure to give a 
requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error if the 
omission "tends to mislead the jury . . . or insufficiently . . . 
advise the Jury on the law." Biswell v. Duncanf 742 P.2d 80, 88 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added) (citing In Re Estate of 
Kesler, 702 P.2d 86, 96-97 (Utah 1985)). 
Defense counsel's series of arguments that the jury 
should judge the driving conduct of the 16-year old defendant 
according to what is reasonable for an inexperienced, 16-year old 
driver misled and confused the jury. Thus, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the jury applied the wrong standard when judging 
the defendant's driving conduct. See Madsen v. Brown. 701 P.2d 
1086, 1091 (Utah 1985). Plaintiff's proposed jury instruction 
would have clarified the law and as a result more adequately 
instructed the jury. 
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In addition, the court's instructions insufficiently 
instructed the jury in that the material substance of plaintiff's 
requested jury instruction was not covered in the other 
instructions. See Meier v. Christensen, 15 Utah 2d 182, 389 P.2d 
734, 735 (Utah 1964). It is well settled that a minor operating 
a motor vehicle is held to same standard as an adult driver. 
Smith v. Salt Lake County. 478 P.2d 496, 498 n.3 (Utah 1970); 
Nelson. 104 P.2d at 228; Burns v. Wheeler. 446 P.2d 925, 929 
(Ariz. 1968). None of the court's instructions advised the jury 
on this standard. And, while no instruction explicitly stated 
that defendant should be held to a lower standard of care than 
that of an adult, defense counsel's arguments necessitated the 
request for a specific instruction advising the jury on the 
requisite standard of care for a 16-year old driver. 
In not allowing plaintiff's requested jury instruction, 
the trial court abused its discretion, resulting in prejudice to 
plaintiff. This instruction would have eliminated confusion and 
more clearly and completely advised the jury on the law. 
POINT II 
DUE TO DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH A SPECIFIC 
ORDER, EXPERT WITNESS RONALD PROBERT SHOULD BE 
EXCLUDED. 
Defendant argues that there was not a specific order 
requiring formal disclosure of witnesses and therefore the court 
was correct in permitting expert witness Ronald Probert to 
testify. Defendant points to Berrett v. Denver and Rio Grande W. 
R.R. Co., Inc., 830 P.2d 291 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), where this 
court stated: 
We hold that absent an order creating a judicially 
imposed deadline, a trial court may not sanction a 
party by excluding its witnesses . . . . 
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Id, at 296. 
At the October 6, 1992 pretrial scheduling conference, 
the court ordered the parties to exchange witness lists by 
November 2, 1992. (R. 765). Pursuant to this order, plaintiff 
submitted a witness list to defense counsel on or about October 
30, 1992. Defendant did not submit a witness list by the 
November 2, 1992 deadline. By letter, on or about December 18, 
1992, defense counsel notified plaintiff's attorney of his intent 
to call Ronald Probert as an expert witness. This was two weeks 
after the close of discovery. 
Defendant contends that because the court's October 6, 
1992 instructions were verbal and no formal order was entered, 
this cannot be construed as an order. This court noted in 
Berrett that while a written order is preferred, it is not 
required. Id. at n.7 (citing Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1244 
(Utah 1980)). Thus, under Berrett, defendant failed to comply 
with the trial court's specific order, albeit verbal, which 
created a judicially imposed deadline. The trial court abused 
its discretion in not granting plaintiff's Motion In Limine to 
exclude defendant's expert witness Ronald Probert. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in not allowing plaintiff's 
requested jury instruction addressing the proper standard of care 
for a minor operating a motor vehicle. Plaintiff's requested 
instruction would have eliminated juror confusion and more 
clearly and completely instructed the jury on the law relative to 
this issue. 
The trial court further erred in not granting 
plaintiff's Motion in Limine to exclude defendant's expert 
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witness Ronald Probert. Defendant failed to comply with a 
specific order requiring the exchange of witness lists by a 
specific date. Defense witness Ronald Probert should therefore 
be precluded from testifying. 
Based on the above and plaintiff's foregoing brief, 
plaintiff asks the Court of Appeals to reverse the trial court's 
rulings and remand for a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 o ^ dav of April, 1994. 
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